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Social  security  systems  usually  cover  less than  the risk of the social security  system's
10  percent of the population  of developing  coun-  insolvency.
tries. Yet in a number  of countries,  these
systems  make up a large proportion  of public  Governments  facing  fiscal  difficulties  find it
sector  revenues  and expenditures.  tempting  to expand  the money  supply  and drive
up inflation.  This cuts government  obligations
Most social  security  systems  in developing  to social security  reserve  funds  by reducing  the
nations  are nnning substantial  surpluses. If the  real value  of the investments  in government
systems  are to meet future  obligations,  reserve  bonds.
funds  and surpluses  should  be invested  in safe
assets  with real positive  rates  of retum.  There is also conrsant  pressure  for many
govenmments  to increase  benefits  without
But  many  countries  lack well-developed  increasing  contributions.  Although  such actioi
financial  markets  and good domestic  opportuni-  is expeaient,  it often  proves unsustainable.  A
ties for productive  investment.  The government  govenmment's  ability  to resist such pressure  thus
usually  controls  social  sec'nrity  systems  - and  has a direct bearing  on the long-term  success  of
often  uses the surpluses  to finance  government  the system.
deficits.
One system  that stands  out as sound,  with
Economists  are divided  over how social  wisely  invested  reserves,  is the regulated  private
security  systems  affect pri-,ate  saving  and capital  social  security  system  in Chile.
accumulation,  which  leads to long-term  growth.
They also disagree  on the inefficiencies  which  This is a background  paper  for the 1988
social security  systems  introduce  into labor  mar-  World  Development  ReporL Copies  are avail-
kets.  able free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street
NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact
It is clear,  however,  that investing  social  Rhoda Blade-Charest,  room  S13-060,  extension
security  funds  in government  securities  increases  33754.
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1.  Introdudtion
Most developing  covntries  have social  security  systems  -
publicly  administered  sets  of programs  which  provide  for  people
in the event  of lose  of income  (due  to retirement,  disability,
death  of a breadwinner,  illness,  maternity,  work-related  injury,
or unemployment)  and often  in the  event  of need  for  medical  care
or the expense  of  raising  children. Usually  - but not  always  -
the  programs  are  not  as  extensive  as  programs  in  industrial
countries.  They  usually  cover  only  a  small  part  of  the  popula-
tion  (often  well  under  ten percent)  and  benefits  are  typically
less  generous  than  those  in the industrial  countries.
Still,  social  security  systems  make  up a large  proportion  of
public  sector  revenues  and  expenditures  .in  a number  of developing
countries. This  fact  may be hidden,  for  in  most countries,
systems  are  managed  by autonomous  public  bodies  whose financial
flows  are  only  partially  reported  in central  government  statis-
tics.  Social  security  systems  have  major  implications  for  public
finance  for  two further  reasons. First,  systems  in  most
developing  countries  have  growing  reserve  funds  which  finance
much of their  governments'  deficits  and also,  sometimes,  provide
a pool  of investment  capital  which  furthers  economic  develop-
ment.  Second,  social  security  systems  pose special  financial
dangers  for  central  governments. Unless  systems  are  managed
effectively  with a  view  to covering  future  liabilities,  they  can
become  insolvent. Already  a number  of systems  have come  to2
require  majbr  allocations  of central-government  revenues.
This  paper  presents  a survey  of the financial  nature  of
social  security  systems  in  developing  countries  and their
implications  for  public-sector  finance  as a whole  and for  the
process  of economic  development. It gives  only  brief  considera-
tion  to the needs  which  give  rise  to social  security  systems  and
the adequacy  of various  countries'  systems  for  meeting  these
needs,  1  It also  passes  over  various  issues  in the  administra-
tion  of social  security: for  example,  the great  multiplicity  of
programs  and  occasional  failure  to collect  taxes,  keep  proper
records,  or distribute  earned  benefits  in some  La'in  American
countries  (Mesa-Lago,  1986).
The remainder  of this  chapter  will  discuss  wiL.  social
security  is and in  what  various  ways it is implemented  in
developing  countries. Chapter  2  will  consider  in  more  detail  the
specific  provisions  and financing  of social  security  programs  in
a sample  of 41 developing  countries. Chapter  3  will  discuss  the
implications,  including  potential  dangers,  of social  security
systems  for  public-sector  finance  generally,  aad Chapter  4 will
consider  the effects  of social  security  systems  on capital  and
labor  markets,  and thus  on the  process  of economic  development.
A final  chapter  will  sum  up the implications  of this  analysis  for
public  policy  in  developing  countries  and for  the research  agenda
of the  World  Bank.3
Origin  and4pread  of social security
The need for social security is often seen to arise in the
transition from a traditional social and economic order to a
modern urban society and industzial economy.  The loosening of
family, kinship, and community ties and the rise of wage labor
add new elements to the age-old problem of providing for those
who lack an income or have medical needs.  Central governments
have assumed responsibility for making this provision. 2
To be sure, government has long (if not generally) been
involved in providing for the poor.  Modern social security,
however, dates from the late nineteenth century when Germany and
Denmark instituted public pension schemes for the greater part of
their working populations.  As Table 1.1 suggests, most European
countries, as well as some of the more industrialized countries
of  North and South America, adopted pension schemes and other
social security programs in the early decades of this century.
Most remaining countries (and  most colonial administrations)
instituted various programs in the twenty years follow'ng the
Second World War.  Most of the world's smaller countries (i.e.,
those with populations below one million), however, have adopted
such programs only since 1965.
We note in Table 1.2 that countries with higher incomes now,
which for the most part have had substantial  modern economic
sectors for a longer time, tend to have adopted social security
programs earlier.  Still, as of 1985 at least 24 out of 37
low-income economies have programs which at least cover work-4
related injury and provide pensions for those retired due to age
or disability and, usually, for dependent survivors.
Types of Benefits
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 also show the typical progressive
institution of programs for different types of benefits.
Usually, work-injury benefits (earnings  replacement and medical
expense) are the first provision to be instituted. 3  After
pensions for old age, disability, and death of a family's
bread-winner, the most common benefits are replacement of
earnings (cash  benefits) in the event of sickness and maternity,
and medical care (provided  directly) or else (rarely)  hospital-
ization insurance. 4  Family allowances - benefits for raising
children - are quite common in the industrial countries, middle-
income European countries, countries in Africa which have a
French colonial heritage, and much of South (but not Central)
America.  Partial replacement of earnings during periods of
involuntary unemployment is universal in the industrial market
countries but not common in developing countries.
Principles of Benefits and Finance
Social security programs are intended to provide adequately
for their beneficiaries, whether this adequacy is viewed as partial
replacement of previous earnings or as providing a minimum or
standard level of benefit to all.  Usually a pragmatic balance is
reached between a concept of social equity, which involves5
redistribution from those better off to those worse off, 5  and
individual equity, which involves providing people wit  benefits
equal in (expected,  discounted) value to their contributions or
taxes.  In nearly all cases both workers and their employers are
deemed responsible to c  ribute to the funding of social
security benefits throug..  'axes on wage or sa-ary earnings.
Additional funding may come from general state revenues or
ear-ma;ked taxes.
Five alternative principles are commonly employed for deter-
mining levels of social security benefits and financing them. The
panels in Table 2 show the application of these principles in
countries with different levels of income per capita.
The principle most often applies is that of social insur-
ance.  Social insurance schemes are funded principally by the
earnings-related contributions of workers and/or their employ-
ers. 6  Earnings-replacing benefits under social insurance vary
positively with a covered worker's earnings.
Universal benefits are of uniform amount and apply to all
residents who experience a given contingency.  Some pension
schemes (chiefly in the industrial countries) combine a uniform
benefit with an earnings-related component.  Medical care,
hospitalization insurance, and family allowances are generally
provided on a universal basis; Table 2 (and  Table 3 below)
reports these benefits as "social insurance," however, in cases
where such schemes are financed from employer and worker
contributions.6
A third  principle,  social  assistance  or means-testing,
directs  benefits  specifically  to those  in  greatest  apparent
need.  It is applied  either  alone  or in  conjunction  with  other
principles,  but it is  now rarely  used.
Employer  liability,  which  is often  applied  in conjunction
with mandatory private insurance,  is used by some countries to
accomplish  the  goals  of social  security  without  involving  the
public  sector  in its  provision. Table  2 gives  counts  for  these
programs  but does  not include  them in  totals  for  social  security
programs.  7
Finally,  provident  funds  collect  contributions  from  workers
and employers  into  personal  accounts  from  which  workers (or  their
survivors)  can  draw in  the events  of old age,  disability,  death,
and in scme  cases  .ther  contingencies. Benefits  are  paid  as lump
sums in  the amount  of accumulated  contributions  plus  interest.
They  are,  effectively,  forced  savings  schemes. Some  provident
funds  originated  as regulated  private  schemes  in British  colonies
which  were  nationalized  and  expanded  after  independence.  Others
were instituted  as public  schemes  from  the  outset. In a few
cases  provident  funds  have  been  converted  into  social  insurance
schemes. Provident  funds  are  sometimes  favored  for  their
administative  simplicity  and for  their  accumulation  of sizeable
reserves  which  may  be applied  to capital  accumulation  or the
funding  of government  debt.7
Reserve  funds,  generosity of benefits, and long-run financial
solvency
Provident funds, by definition, maintain reserve funds equal
in value to their liabilities for future benefit payments, and
they return to their participants an amount equal in expected
present value to their (and their employers') contributions.
Early social-insurance pension schemes, both in Europe and in
Latin America, also had these characteristics; thus they operated
on the same principles as the private insurance which had often
previously been offered by mutual-aid societies and similar
institutions - except that coverage was made mandatory and
extended to larger groups of workers.
Naturally, it was realized that by drawing down the reserve
funds benefits can, for.a time, be raised above levels that
simply provide a fair return on contributions.  Thus all the
early social insurance pension schemes moved towards the princi-
ple of "pay-as-you-go" financing, under which current contribu-
tions pay for current benefits. 8  9  Some of these systems, both
in Europe and in Latin America, have required special ear-marked
taxes or special allocations from general revenues to remain
solvent.
The younger social-security pension schemes in developing
countries have had much less in the way of previous private
systems to build upon.  For the most part they never intended to
maintain full-funding - today only Kuwait's scheme, Chile's new
privatized system, and the various provident funds are fully-8
funded - but they do operate on the basis of partial-reserve
financing, with a view to "asuring solvency over a  horizon of a
few decades into the future.  Many of them, in fact, are accumu-
lating substantial surpluses (sometimes over half their revenues)
into reserve funds.  This accumulation is largely for the reason
that the pension schemes h4ve not yet "matured" - they do not yet
have a  full complement of pensioners eligible for full benefits.
Chapter 3 considers at greater length the financial diffi-
cuVies  of some Latin American schemes and the prospect  or the
continued  financial  solvency  of the  younger  schemes  in developing
countries.9
2. Den*fitv and rinance in a sample of Countries
We now turn from these general consideratiens to an examina-
tion of the structure of social security in a sample of 41
developing countries drawn from every major region of the world.
Our sample also considers three industrial market countries (not
especially typical) in order to enable some comparison with them.
Types, Principles, and Level of Benefits
Table 3 presents the range of benefits provided by the
social security systems in our sample, the principles by wh'ch
these benefits are financed, and a partial account of how
retirement pensions are determined.  Within each regional section
countries are ordered from the lowest per-capita income to the
highest.  As in Tables 1 and 2 above, we note that the fullest
range of benefits are provided in Latin America and in Europe,
the Middle East, and North Africa.  Soe-ial  insurance is the most
common principle of provision, provident funds are common in
Sub-saharan Africa and Asia (nearly  always in former British
colonies), and employer liability is occasionally invoked
(especially  in Africa) for cash sickness and maternity benefits,
some medical care, unemployment (severance)  benefits, and most
often for work-injury insurance.  China, notably, charges its
collectives and other employers with responsibility for the full
range of benefits provided 1 (Wallich 1986).  Several countries
have programs which operate under a combination of principles,10
adding soctal assistance, universal benefits, or employer
liability to social insurance  or provident funds.
Since 1981 Chile has largely  privatized its social security
system.  Previously the country (like  many Latin American nations
still) had a  number of social insurance systems covering differ-
ent sets of workers.  Those systems (now  partially unified) are
still in effect for reptrees a.sd  the 40 percent of the active
labor.force who have not switched to the new system.  Several
private commpanies have been organized to operate under state
supervision, providing pensions, on a fully-funded  basis, as well
as cash sickness and maternity benefits and medical insurance
(Lacey 1987).
Under the heading "medical care" we note, by the letter "M",
countries in which a public medical system operates separately
from the social security system.  Possibly not all such systems
are noted, however.
Another substantial omission is that of the ccmmon, but non-
legislated, provision of private pensions and private insurance,
often through employers, in several countries.  This practice is
much more common, however, in the industrial market countries -
most notably in the United States.
The last three columns of Table 3 present a very summary
account of who is eligible for old-age pensions and how substan-
tial are the benefits provided.  The normal retirement age is the
age at which covered workers (sometimes  with exceptions for
miners, other occupations, or the unemployed) are eligible for11
full benefit..  In many cases reduced benefits are available at a
lower age, and sometimes higher benefits are given to those who
delay retirement until after the normal age.  We see in the table
that normal retirement ages are 60 to 65 for men, and usually
lower for women, in most of the industrial market countries,
Latin America, and Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.  In
Sub-saharan Africa and Asia, which for the most part have lower
life expectancies, normal retirement ages are usually 55 or 60
for men and sometimes lower for women.  Most provident funds
permit withdrawal from one's account at age 55, often without any
requirement for actual retirement.  Under social insurance
programs rules for actual retirement vary widely.
Levels of benefits nearly always depend on both the number
of  years of contributions and the level on one's earnings (or  of
one's contributions) over either the last several years of one's
working life or else all of one's covered working life.  The
rules which govern benefits are often quite complex, so that the
figures in the last two columns of Table 3 are hardly complete in
the information they convey.  In most cases the specified number
of years of required contributions makes one eligible for the
minimum specified earnings replacement rate, while additional
years of contributions makes one eligible for a higher replace-
ment rate.  Sometimes, however, higher raplacement rates are for
those with lower average earnings (i.e.,  the benefit formula is
progressive).  Often the legislated formulae for levels of
benefits do not specify a replacement rate.  In these cases a "C"12
in the table indicates that benefits vary with total contribu-
tions or covered earnings.  "B" in this column designates that
there is a "base" Ievel of benefits to which are added benefits
which vary with contributions or earnings.  Provident funds,
indicated by "PI',  pay a lump-sum  benefit in the amount of
accumulated contributions plus interest.
We see that, for the most part, pension benefits replace
between one third and four fifths of one's pre-retirement
earnings - with benefits closer to-the higher figure for long
periods of coverage.  There is little general difference in
replacement rates among regions, or for that matter between
countries of different income levels within a region.
Extent of Coverage in the Population
In most of the developing world social security applies
mainly to urban wage labor - usually a small part of the popula-
tion.  Only in the middle-income countries of Europe, in several
countries in Latin America, and in a few other countries such as
Israel, Mauritius, and Singapore is the majority of the labor
force and population covered.  In most other countries it seems
likely, based on categories of covered workers, that less than
ten percent of the population is covered.  As Mesa-Lago  (1986)
notes for the Latin American countries, "In general the extension
of risk coverage has been much faster than that of population
coverage.... [O]ften  a minority of the population is covered
against all risks, but the majority is not protected against any13
risks  at alj.,*  2
Table 4 presents the results of Mesa-Lago's (1986)  study of
social security coverage in Latin America. 3  For the most part
extent of coverage varies directly with per-capita income,
although the countries of northern South America and Central
America have lower coverage than countries of comparable income
further south.  Several higher-income countries provide more
extensive coverage for sickness and maternity benefits than for
pensions.  Among the lower-income countries sickness and
maternity benefits are available less widely than pensions.
Unfortunately there are (apparently)  no comparable studies
for other developing countries.  Brief, sometimes imprecise
descriptions of the covered population are, however, provided in
the United States Social Security Administration's biennial
report Social Security Programs Throughout the World.  These
descriptions make it clear that there are substantial restric-
tions even on the extent of coverage of urban wage labor in
(among  our sample of developing countries) Ghana, Nigeria, India,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Singapore. 4  In these
cases only larger employers or a limited range of industries are
covered.  In many other of our sample countries, social security
does not apply to domestic workers or casual workers.  Family
workers - usually a substantial  portion of urban  (as  well as
rural) workers - are seldom covered.  The urban self-employed are
covered in Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, Portugal, and Yugoslavia; they
are also covered voluntarily or in a limited range of occupations14
in Mauritius, Hungary, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Singapore.  It is often not clear in these descriptions to what
extent rural employees or the rural self-employed are covered.
There is certainly coverage for at least some rural workers in
Zambia, Cameroon, Morocco, Israel, Hungary, Portugal, Yugoslavia,
Sri Lanka, and China. 5
Mesa-Lago  (1986)  points out that in Latin America, "coverage
tendr to be positively correlated with income, the degree of
skill at work and the power of pressure groups."  Similarly, in
the rest of the developing world it is the urban elites who
receive the most protection under social security while needier
groups are not covered. 6  This becomes a matter of particular
concern to the extent that social security is paid for out of
general revenues or will later become a burden upon the central
government.  In these cases - arguably rare outside of Latin
America - socal security systems may constitute a mechanism for a
perverse redistribution from the worse- to the better-off.
The  financial  size of social  security  systems
While it is difficult to determine the extent of social
security coverage in the population, information on financial
flows is accessible for most countries.  Tables 5 through 8
present information collected by the International Labour Office
for its triennial survey, Cost of Social Security. 7  Table 5, in
particular, presents the size of social security finances
relative to the economy as a whole as measured by Gross Domestic15
Product. 8-_
The table presents information  not only on social security
programs for the public as a  whole but also on programs which
apply only to public employees and programs apart form social
security which provide public health care and public (or social)
assistance.  These programs fall under the International Labour
Office's definition of social security programs, and they may be
categprized as social security in government financial statis-
ti-.s,  but they are not considered in the present paper apart from
this table. 9  We note that systems for public employees are
sometimes larger than broader social security programs.  Where no
flows are reported for public-employee systems, it is either the
case that public employees are covered only under the general
system or that the finances for such systems are not reported to
the I.L.O.
As we focus on the first four columns of Table 5 we see that
social security systems involve the largest share of an economy's
product in Chile, 10  the higher-income European and
Middle-Eastern countries, Singapore, and the industrial market
countries.  Social security involves a very small portion of the
economy - less than 0.2 percent - in Nigeria, Bangladesh, Burma,
Pakistan, Indonesia, and Thailand.  Other figures for receipts
and expenditures vary widely, with some tendency for richer
countries to distribute a larger portion of their product through
the social security system.
We also see in Table 5 that only three countries in our16
sample - Peru, Mexico, and Portugal - have deficits, of about
seven percent, four percent, and one percent of revenue respec-
tively.  A substantial number of countries, especially in Asia
and Sub-saharan Africa, have high surpluses - often more than 50
percent of revenues. 11
Sources of Revenue for Social Security Systems
Table 7 presents information on sources of revenue for
social security systems.  In the first two columns it lists the
sta&utory contribution rates which are applied to workers' wage
and balary earnings (or, from employers' point of view, to
payroll).  The remaining columns present the percentage of total
revenues supplied by contributions, special taxes and general
state revenues, income from investment of reserve funds, and
miscellaneous sources.
In nearly half of the countries sampled, contribution rates
for insured workers and their employers total between 10 and 20
percent.  Most of the remaining countries have contribution rates
between 20 and 30 percent.  Argentina and Portugal have combined
rates well in excess of 30 percent, while Singapore's rate is 50
percent - 25 percent each from insured workers and employers. 12
The lowest contribution rates, well below 10 percent, are found
in Burma, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea, the only countries
listed which do not have pension coverage.
Except in Chile and Yugoslavia employers are charged (taxed)
a higher contribution rate than workers. 13  In part this is17
because the portions of the contribution  which finance work-
injury insurance and family allowances are nearly always charged
entirely to the employer.
Special taxes and general revenues constitute no more than a
small part of revenues in most developing countries, while their
reserve funds provide a  substantial investment income (at  least
in the nominal, i.e. non-inflation-adjusted, terms reported). 14
In industrial market countries, by contrast, the state often
supplies a substantial part of revenues while reserve funds are
too small to provide much revenue.  State participation  in Chile
has become particularly high in the past several years in order
to provide benefits for current beneficiaries while the youngest
cohorts' contributions are directed into the private system. 15
Relative size of benefit programs
Programs for old age, disability, and survivors' pensions
receive the largest portion of revenue in most countries' social
security systems but, due to the immaturity of most such programs
in developing countries, they expend a somewhat smaller share of
benefits than they receive as a share of revenues.  The surpluses
we examined above are almost solely for the purpose of providing
for future increases in pension expenditures.  Thus the relative
shares of benefits which we now examine in Table 8 give an
incomplete picture of the relative importance of different types
of benefits.
Even so, the tables show that a number of countries - Peru,18
Colombia, Maxico, Bangladesh, Burma, and Pakistan - place greater
weight on sickness and maternity insurance and on medical care
than on pensions.  These benefits are also relatively high
throughout Latin America, in Europe (including  Turkey), and in
Israel, but they are low or zero in Sub-saharan Africa and much
of East Asia.  Family allowances make up large proportions of
benefits in the African countries once colonized by France (the
proportions are as high as they are, obviously, due to the
immaturity of pension programs in these countries) and are also
offered, as we  noted above, in Europe and parts of South
America.  Work-injury coverage looms large in the finances of the
Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Indonesia (where  coverage for work
injury is much broader than that for the provident fund), and
Thailand (where  work-injury insurance is the only coverage
provided).  Countries with provident funds usually provide little
in benefits for contingencies other than old age, disability, and
death.19
3.  The  Conibquences  of Social Security Systems for Public-Sector
Yinance
The institution of a social security system - and particu-
larly of a  pension scheme - obligates a government to pay
increasing levels of benefits as the scheme matures (that is, as
successive cohorts of new beneficiaries have been covered longer
and are eligible for increased benefits) and as life expectancy
improves.  This growing financial obligation can prove quite
burdensome to a government under some financial arrangements for
social security systems.
We have seen that most social security systems in developing
countries are not yet mature, are running substantial surpluses,
and are financed without resort to substantial sums in special
taxes or general state revenues.  Some, indeed, reap substantial
revenues from investment of their surpluses.
Usually these systems are managed by decentralized public
agencies, and their surpluses are usually kept nominally separate
from funds of the central government.  The surpluses, however,
are often used to purchase the central government's debt - that
is, 1z finance its deficits.  This raises a question, at least,
as to how real are the reserve funds of social security systems,
or how independent are these systems from the central government
and its policies.
A government which grows accustomed to using the substantial
surpluses of a social security system to finance its deficits may
have sufficient difficulty funding its operations once the social20
security system  matuxen and peapes to run surpluses that it will
not be able to redeem the bonds held in the social security
reserve fund.  A more subtle, and more common, means by which a
government escapes its obligation to its social security reserve
fund is through high inflation, which erodes the value of
nominally fixed assets such as government bonds.  High inflation
has periodically eroded the reserve funds of Latin American
systems.
Administrators of social security systems are not always
required to invest their assets in government bonds.  High
inflation can still greatly reduce the value of reserve funds eld
in private assets - as it did in Turkey in the late 1970's and
early 1980's.  Moreover, due to a lack of developed local
financial markets, however, (and  in a desire to invest
domestically rather than abroad) they may lack good opportunities
for investment.  Thus it is the considered opinion of staff
workers in social security at the International Labour Office
that while most social security systems of Africa, Asia, and the
Caribbean are actuarially sound, they may yet experience finan-
cial difficulties due to the lack of good investment opportuni-
ties. 1
The actuarial soundness of social security finance can be
altered ty a variety of demographic, economic, and political
factors.  An unexpected rise in life expectancy, decline in the
birth rate, or increase in emigration raises the "dependency
ratio" - the number of pension beneficiaries per contributing21
worker - and thus worsens the  financial picture.  Economic growth
increases the base upon which contributions are paid, and thus
increases revenues, while prolonged stagnation reduces financial
surpluses.  Political pressures may lead to benefit increases
which, though temporarily expedient, are unsustainable in the
long run without increased revenues.  It is difficult, political-
ly,  later  to reduce benefits.  If it is also politically diffi-
cult or economically harmful to raise contribution rates, special
taxes or general revenues must be resorted to in order to pay for
benefits.
Mesa-Lago  (1986,  pp. 143-4)  confirms this analysis in his
list of factors which threaten the financial stability of "the
oldest and most highly developed systems" in Latin America.  In
addition to normal and foreseeable factors such as those relating
to the maturation of systamd, he mentions "quite liberal legisla-
tion on benefits,  ...  an increasing number of pensioners who are
living longer than was expected both in the original legislation
and in older actuarial estimates, thus receiving their pensions
and health benefits for longer periods" and the facts that "the
contribution burden of social security is excessive and it is
very difficult, politically and economically, to increase either
social security contributions or taxes" and that "the yield .on
pension funds has turned out to be very low, and even negative in
the high-inflation countries...."  He also adds some factors
other than those in the analysis above:22
ET]herb is a high level of evasion and delay, particularly
in the countries which have high and sustained inflation
(where  delaying payment means a reduction in one's real
contribution);  ...  the State - under pressure to meet multiple
and demanding requirements - fails to comply with its
financial obligations, thus leading to the accumulation of
very large debts;...and...the transfers (or "loans") from
the pension funds to cover the deficits of health programmes
(the cost of which have escalated due to "a capital-inten-
sive system of remedial medicine"] are difficult to reim-
burse in practice, which has contributed to the de-capitali-
sation of the funds, at a time it is necessary to use the
accumulated technical reserves to meet the current pension
payments.
Two additional factors which have had a notable effect on
the financial solvency of social security in Uruguay are low
retirement age (60 for men, 55 for women - but retirement at
substantially younger ages for unemployed persons was permitted,
and often accepted, until 1981), high life expectancy (72 at
birth 2 but of course higher for those who survive until
retirement age), and a high rate of emigration among the young.
Together, these factors lead to a very high dependency ratio of
.82 pensioners per contributor in 1983 (Mesa-Lago,  1985, cited in
World Bank, 1986, pp. 80) and contributed to a deficit fully 60
percent as great as revenues in 1980 (Mesa-Lago 1986), requiring
a subsidy from the central government of over four percent of GDP
in 1983 (World  Bank, 1986, p. 83). 3 4
It was partly Chile's experience with the need to use
general revenues to maintain the solvency of its social security
system that led it to institute its privatized system.  A
noteworthy feature of this system is that it maintains  its
actuarial soundness through full funding and the limitation23
(apart  frow  a state-guArantebd  minimum  benefit  linked  to the
minimum  wage)  of  the  expected  value  of one's  benefits  to one's
contributions  plus interest. The state  is thus  protected  in  the
long  run from  any  need  to maintain  the solvency  of the system,
although  now in the absence  of the  contributions  of those  who
switched  to the privatized  system  it  must  make  substantial
contributions  to pay benefits  for  current  retirees. Thus far  the
average  real  rate  of return  on fund  investments  has been  an
astounding 16.8 percent and fund investments  have risen to 50
percent  of total  term  deposits  in  the financial  system (Lacey
1987).
The financial  difficulties  of the  older  Latin  American
schemes  may or may not  be repeated  in the  younger  schemes  in
Latin  America  or in the rest  of the developing  world. Whether  it
is  depends  on the abilities  of governments  to withstand  political
pressures  either  to raise  benefits  (and  thus  give  substantial
tr'ansfers  to current  beneficiaries  and  those  soon  to retire)
without providingj  for their financing  or else to maintain
contribution  rates  or relatively  low retirement  ages  in the face
of the  need  to raise  one  or the other  due to increasing  life
expectancy  (see  Mesa-Lago  (1986),  pp. 145-6). It also  depends,
as  we have seen,  on the  ability  of social  security  administrators
to place  their  reserve  funds  in safe  assets  with  a positive  real
rate  of return.24
4.  The  Consqu.nces  of Social  security Systems for Economic
Growth
Due to the magnitudes of their financial flows, social
security systems can have substantial impacts on the economy
through both the capital market and the labor market.  The nature
and degree of some of these impacts are matters of significant
dis'ute among economists.  While studies have focused primarily
on the industrial market countries, their insights or assertions
can be applied to developing countties as well.
The impact of social security systems on capital market
comprises both the direct effect arising through the accumulation
of reserves and the behavioral response of covered individuals to
the prospect of their future pension benefits.  Reserves may be
invested (domestically)  either in government bonds or (either
directly or through financial instruments) in capital goods.  The
effect of investment in government bonds may be either to enable
increased government spending, to reduce taxes, to reduce foreign
borrowing, or to free other savings for capital investment.
Unfortunately information is not readily available concern-
ing how, or to what extent, reserves are used to finance capital
accumulation.  One very interesting  use for which information is
available is the use of Singapore's provident fund to finance
housing (Wallich 1987).  Not only are public housing projects
financed this way, but individuals  may borrow against their
accounts to purchase homes.  The provident fund holds mortgages
and receives regular payments on these loans; any balances25
outstanding when covered workers receive their lump-sum benefits
are deducted from these benefits.  Nearly half the participants
in provident funds have used them to finance purchases of homes.
People's behavioral response to their prospective pension
benefits, or "social security wealth," is a matter of substantial
dispute.  The basic issue is this:  to what extent do people
reduce private saving because their expected pensions replace
that which they need to save?  If the reduction is of a substan-
tial magnitude, as argued by Feldstein (1974,  1982), then, unless
reserves are used to replace these savings in the generation of
capital, a social security system will reduce a nation's total
savings and capital stock.  Barro (1974)  has argued, to the
contrary, that private inter-generational transfers offset the
effects of public transfers even in a pay-as-you-go system, so
that saving is unaffected.  For &  more extensive survey of the
theoreti-al issues and empirical evidence see Wallich (1983),
Shome and Squire (1983),  or Munnell (1986).
A  further argument is sometimes made about savings and
capital accumulation in developing countries in particular.  Many
people in these countries have no prior experience with financial
institutions.  Social security programs give them such experience
and therefore, it is said, encourage a "habit of saving."  Thus
they stimulate financial savings in addition to those generated
through the programs' reserves.
Social security systems affect the labor market both by
inducing earlier retirement and by introducing  distortionary26
marginal taxes on wage payments.  The first effect is important
and undisputed.1 The second effect hinges on two disputed
questions:  (1)  what is the incidence of the payroll taxes, or
contributions, of both insured  workers and employers, and (2)
does an insured worker view contributions as a tax or as deferred
compensation.  The answers to these quustions determine the
extent to which contributions function as taxes which raise
employers' cost of labor above workers' wages, bringing
inefficiencies 2 to the labor market while tending to reduce
employment. 3
Many economists hold, on the bases of a  marginal-product
theory of wage determination, that employers' contributions are
effectively paid by workers.  The International Labour Office
(1984)  argues virtually the opposite:  that workers are able to
bargain for wage increases to offset increases in their contribu-
tions.  Some economists argue that part of the incidence of the
tax is passes on in the price of products.  See Brittain (1972)
for an evaluation of these and related arguments.
Whether a worker views contributions (including those of the
employer) as a tax or as deferred compensation depends on large
part on the perceived marginal linkage between these contribu-
tions and expected benefits.  Under a provident fun-d  or a system,
like the new privatized pension scheme in Chile, which operate on
the basis of private insurance principles, expected benefits rise
on a one-to-one basis with contributions, provided that one's
credited rate of return matches one's personal discount rate. 427
In many sywtems benefits are provided on a progressive basis, so
that while one's total expected benefits may exceed one's
contributions, the marginal linkage is often less than unity and
workers can rightly view part of their contribution as a tax.
Some countries use only the several last or highest-earnings
years to determine the level of ones  benefits; in such cases
most of one's contributions have no marginal linkage to bene-
fits.. Of course, covered individuals  may not be able to evaluate
the implications of the more complicated formulae used to
determine benefits.  Still, they do develop attitudes about
whether they will get a sufficient return for the contributions
they make, and these attitudes affect their choices in the labor
market.28
5. Conclusion
In view of the substantial  consequences  of social security
systems for the integrity  of government finance,  for economic  ef-
ficiency  and growth,  and for equity,  what guidelines  should  govern
the structure  and operation  of such systems?
First, systems  must be managed in a way that assures  their
long-term financial  viability.  Benefits  must be limited  to what
is sustainable  from  revenues  over a horizon  of several  decades.
Systems must be made effectively  --  not  just formally  --  autono-
mous from the central  government,  and they must be given both the
right and the accountable  responsibility  to invest  trust funds in
a range of effective investments. If they are required  to pur-
chase government  bonds (for  a limited  portion of their portfolios
only),  these bonds must be credibly indexed  for inflation.
Second,  it is highly important  both that there be an explicit
linkage  between one's contributions  and one's benefits  and also
that one's benefits  be based on one's entire stream  of contribu-
tions.  This  will not only enable  households  to plan their futures
with some confidence,  but will also increase  efficiency in labor
markets (and  in other markets  affected  by labor  markets).  To
these same ends it is important  as well that participants  be able
to have confidence in the adequacy  of record-keeping,  in the
prompt payment of earned  benefits,  and in the continuing financial
viability of the system.
Third, reserve funds for  pension  programs should  be used for
the formation  of capital.  While it is  unclear  whether the exist-
ence of such programs recduces  private saving for investment,  pub-
lic programs can further  a country's  development  if invested  well.
This may prove difficult,  however, in some countries.
Fourth, systems  must be equitable.  Care muet be taken in
this especially  where it is impossible  to extend  effective  cover-
age beyond an already  privileged segment  of the population.
Privileged classes  should  not receive  benefits greatly  exceeding
their contributions.  Systems  should  be financed  only from  the29
contributions  of those who will benefit --  not from aeneral reve-
nues (except,  perhaps, for benefits  which are universal).  Because
the burden of payroll taxes may be born partly by consumers  who do
not benefit from  the system,  the scale of the system  should  be
kept relatively  limited.
All of these considerations  commend  systems  that are rela-
tively straightforward  in structure,  simple  to administer,  and
based on sound actuarial  principles.  Among such systems  are the
various  provident funds and the regulated  privatized system  of
Chile.  These particular  models  need not be taken as normative,
but system  structures  which depart far from  the guidelines  here
can easily give rise to financial pitfalls,  slower growth,  o.L  hLars
to many residents  of countries  that adopt them.30
Notes  to  Chapter  1
1. For information on these matters the reader is directed to
various publications of the International Labour Office, parti-
cularly Introduction to Social Security (third  edition, 1984).
2.In developing countries particularly, financial markets are
usually insufficiently developed to offer on a private basis the
insurance and annuity coverage of social security systems.
3. This is usually done initially through provisions in the labor
code which make employers liable to furnish or arrange private
insurance for such benefits.  Statistics are not readily avail-
able to indicate when public administration of such benefits
began in various countries.  Hence, Tables 1.1 and 1.2 count
employer-liability programs for work-injury coverage, although
they do not count employer-liability programs for other types of
'-Jn  AO  J  -a.
4. In this chapter's tables, the figures for medical care include
only those countries in which such care is provided through the
social security system.  Countries which provide free or low-cost
medical care under other administrative arrangements are not
counted here, although some of them are tallied below in Table 3.
5. In actual operation a social security system may perversely
give a positive transfer to some who are well off.  This is
documerted for the United States' Old Age and Survivors Insurance
in Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert, and Shoven (1987).
S.  Government may contribute also, out of general revenues or
through ear-marked taxes.
7. See note 3 above concerning the inclusion of employer-liabili-
ty work-injury programs in Table 1.
8. For an analysis of how this possibility became politically-
expedient policy in Latin America see Mesa-Lago (1986),  p. 143.
Also, in several cases pay-as-you-go financing has resulted from
the loss of reserve funds, either through their effective
confiscation f'or  other governmental expenditures or through high
inflation and financial crisis.  The latter happened, notably, to
the original social-insurance pension scheme, that of Germany, in
Germany's hyper-inflation of 1923 and in the financial crisis
which, in the Federal Republic of Germany, followed World War
II.  The related experience of Latin American and other develop-
ing countries is discussed below in chapter 3.
9. If population and real wages grow fast enough, benefits can
be raised above the value of contributions indefinitely without
the maintainance of any reserve fund.  If growth is slower,31
beneficiaries (apart from the initial generation, which receives
a windfall) receive loss than  the  value of their contributions.
Theso conditions are  discussed by Wallich (1983)  and Samuelson
(1958).  In fact, due to recent  declines in both fertility and
economic growth, younger generations in many countries can expect
to receive less than a fair-insurance return on their (and their
employers') contributions.  This has been most extensively
documented for the United States (see Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert,
and Shoven (1987))  but is evident for most industrial countries
and at least some middle-income countries.  Apparently there has
been little research on this matter for developing countries
generally.32
Notes  to  Chapter  2
1. These benefits are funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, which will
prove particularly burdensome for collectives with an older than
average work force.
2. Outside Latin America, we may note in several tables, few
developing countries have protection against all risks.
3. See lIesa-Lago's  study for a discussion of the inherent defects
in making these sorts of estimates.
4. Still, 80 percent of Singapore's labor force is covered (Asher
1985).
5. These descriptions could ba used together with data on the
proportion of the labor force in various sectors of the economy
to develop very rough estimates of the extent of coverage in the
population.  Alternatively, imprecise estimates could be derived
from legislated contribution rLtes together with data on revenues
of social security systems.  Of more direct relevance for the
present study, however, is the information presented below on the
size of social security receipts, expenditures, and surpluses
relative to the economy as a whole.
6. It is usually much easier to provide coverage to urban wage
laborers than to others.
7. The most recent edition, the Twelfth International Inquiry, is
forthcoming in 1988.  The data as we have them are provisional.
As of the writing of the present version of the present paper
information is lacking for several countries in our sample.
Space is left in Tables 5 through 8 to accomodate this informa-
tion if and when it becomes available.  Note that these tables
delete those countries in Table 3 which have no public social
security system.
8. It would also be worthwhile to view  these financial flows as
proportions of public-sector financial flows as a whole.  This
exercise awaits the development of the latter figures by the
staff of the World Development Report - 1988.
9. Another category of benefits reported by the I.L.O. is that of
benefits to war victims.  In the present sample only Israel,
Japan, Sweden, and the United States provide such benefits.
10. [Argentina and Uruguay should be added to this list if data
becomes available for a later draft.]
11. (Here insert data on surpluses in Egypt if it becomes
available from the I.L.O.]33
12. Singapore's combined contribution rate is 40 percent of the
employer's wage bill - for the wage bill including the employer's
contribution is 125 percent of nominal wages.
13. But see the discussion in chapter 3 of the incidence of this
tax.
14. See Chapter 3 concerning the real erosion of reserve funds
due to inflation.  Such erosion would not be reported in the
figures here.
15. There is little explicit information to account for the other
non-zero figures in the last three columns.  One suspects that
the high figure for "other" revenue for Indonesia largely
refle-ts investment income, which is not reported as such.34
Notes  to Chapter 3
1. This point was made in a  telephone conversation with an
analyst at the I.L.O.  The I.L.O. has worked with many of these
systems to establish their actuarial soundness.
2. Source: World Development Indicators - 1987.
3. Uruguay is now undertaking a substantial reform of its social
security system, with some assistance from the World Bank.
4. [Substitute  information from I.L.O. to avoid citing
unavailable source and to use 1983 as a comon  year.]i  35
Notes  to  Clapter  4
1. The prospect of earlier retirement tends to raise rates of
saving, tending to offset the reduction in saving which  social
security otherwise induces.  See  Munnell (1986).
2. These inefficiencies, or "dead-weight losses," vary roughly
with the square of the total tax rate (including the rate for
other income taxes) applied to payroll or to wage income.
3. The impact of payroll tax rates on the cost of labor as a
factor of production, affecting the labor-intensity of produc-
tion, has been of particular concern in the European market
economies.  In an effort to reduce unemployment, several of these
countries have reduced the role of contributions based on labor
earnings in financing social security.
4  The expected value of benefits is actually even areater when
one considers the insurance value of "contingent assets" for
risk-averse individuals.36
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Table  1.2  Adaption  of  social  security  progress
(Number  of  economies  with  programs  In  selected  years)
Lo*-noome  economies  (31  out  of  37  reported  som  program  as  of  1965)
Type  of  benefit  1925  1945  1965  1985
Old  age,  disability,  or  death  0  0  17  24
Sickness  or  maternity  0  0  14  14
Work  injury  4  17  30  31
Unemployment  0  0  0  1
Family  Allowance  0  0  10  10
Lower  middle-income  economies  (33  out  of  36 reported  sowa  program  as  of  1985)
Type  of  benefit  1925  1945  1965  1985
Old  age,  diubility.  or  death  1  5  25  30
Sickness  or  maternity  1  7  22  23
Work  Injury  8  25  30  32
Unemployment  0  1  3  6
Family  Allowance  0  4  10  11
Upper  middle-income  economies  (23  out  of  24  reported  some  program  as  of  1965)
Type  of  benefits  1925  1945  1965  1985
Old  age,  disability,  or  death  3  13  20  22
Sickness  or  maternity  6  12  18  19
Work  InJury  13  21  23  23
Unevployment  0  4  5  8
Family  Allowance  0  6  14  14
Industrial  market  economies  (19  out  of  19  reported  some  program  as  of  1985)
Type  of  benefits  1925  1945  1965  1985
Old  age,  disability,  or  death  13  17  19  19
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Social  or  Soial  Prowidnt  fplow  r  Social  or  sowial  Providnt  Etowr
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Table  4  Coverage  of population  and  active  labor  force  in  Latin  America,  1980
Population  covered  Active  labor
in sickness  and  force  covered  in
maternity  program  pension  program
Country  (percent)  (percent)
Low  income
Haiti  1  2
Lower  middle-income
Bolivia  25  18
Honduras  7  13
Nicaragua  9  19
Dominican  Republic  8  14
El Salvador  6  12
Paraguay  18  14
Peru  17  37
Ecuador  8  23
Cuatemala  14  33
Costa  Rica  78  68
Colombia  12  22
Chile  67  62
Upper middle-income
Brazil  96  96
Uruguay  69  81
Mexico  53  42
Panama  50  46
Argentina  79  69
Venezuela  45  50
Source: Carmelo  Mesa-Lago  (1986),  "Comparative  Study  of the  Development  of
Social  Security  in  Latin  America",  International  Social  Security  Review  39,
2:  127-152,  Tables  1  and  3.43
Table  5.  Financial  flows  of  social  security  and  related  prograes  (fiscal  year  ending  during  1983).
(Percentage  of  GOP,  except  or  Surplus/Receipts)
Social  Security  System  - ----  Public  Employees  System---  Other  Prograss----
Country  Receipts  Expenditures:  Surplus  Surplus/  Receipts  Expend:-  Surplus  Public Public
…  b----aenefits  Totai  Receipts  tures  Medical  Assistance
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean
Haiti
Dominican  Rep.
Jamaica  2.222  0.597 0.767 1.46X  65.9Z  0.70X  0.59X 0.112  0.62%  0.24X
Peru  2.15X 2.047  2.30d  -0.14%  -6.71  0.00  0.007.  0.002 0.00  0.002
Coluabia  2.03Z 1.52X 1.75X  0.298 13.97  0.52Z 0.477  0.04X  0.007  0.007
Chile  16.732  13.01X  14.297  2.44UX  14.67  0.007  0.001 0.002  0.00  0.00
Brazil  5.52X  5.071 5.461 O.Ob%  1.17  0.152 0.15%  0.00  0.00  0.002




Kenya  0.777 0.052  0.072 0.70Q 90.8X  0.00  0.00O  0.002 0.002 0.002
Ghana
Zambia  2.62X  0.86Z 1.22X 1.407  53.32  0.00  0.002  0.00  0.00  0.00
Cote  d  lvoire  1.17Z  0.51Z  0.65X 0.51X  43.91  0.002  0.00% 0.00  0.007.  0.0OX
Nigeria  0.17X 0.012  0.02Z 0.14.  85.67  0.002  0.002 0.00%  0.007  0.00
Cameroon  1.427  0.367  0.367 1.06I  74.5X  0.211 0.217  0.007.  0.001 0.001
Mauritius  3.54X 1.989  1.989  1.57J 44.2Z  0.00O 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.162
Congo  1.91X  0.61%  0.917 1.007  52.57  0.007.  0.00.  0.00  0.00  0.007.
Europe,  Middle  East,  and  North  Africa
Morocco  1.54X  0.91B  0.86X 0.67X 43.77  0.002 0.001  0.007 0.007 0.001
Egypt
Turkey  3.39%  2.237  2.367 1.02X  30.37  1.47X  1.417  0.05X  0.31X  0.01Z
Tunisia
Hungary  15.44UZ  15.362  15.447  0.007.  0.07.  0.007 0.007.  0.00. 0.00  0.00
Portugal  7.eb7 7.447  7.95X  -0.09X  -1.17  1.747  1.787  -0.04X  3.387 0.40Z
Yugoslavia  11.337  10.332  11.272  0.067 0.57  0.00. 0.007.  0.00.  0.00.  0.00
Cyprus  6.537 3.447  3.52X 3.017 46.17  1.55X  1.13X  0.41X 1.937 0.387
Israel  10.427  7.921  9.27X 1.15X  11.17.  0.9.  0.807  0.002  0.00  0.72X
Asia
Bangladesh  0.017  0.007.  0.00  0.012  55.3X  0.00  0.002  0.002  0.00  0.00O
Bursa  0.089 0.047  0.057 0.02X  31.37  0.007.  0.00  0.00  0.007.  0.007
India  1.33X  0.497  0.517 0.82I  bl.3  1.44X  0.927.  0.52X  0.007  0.047.
Pakistan  0.107  0.037  0.047 0.067 60.37  0.377 0.377  0.007.  0.00  0.217
Sri  Lanka  2.00X  0.327  0.347 1.667  83.07  0.477 1.81%  -1.34X  0.007 0.067
Indonesia  0.09% 0.017  0.027 0.057 71.87  0.007 0.00  0.007.  0.007.  0.00
Philippines 1.002  0.31X  0.342 0.67X  66.47  0.757  0.40X 0.357  0.007  0.002
Thailand  0.047 0.017 0.012  0.027 63.77  0.161  0.16.  0.007.  0.00. 0.00
Malaysia  5.321  0.77X  0.83Z 4.49X 84.4Z  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04N
Korea
Singapore  14.707  3.797 6.431  B.277 56.37  0.26X  0.267  0.007 0.93Z 0.017
Industrial  Market  Countries
Japan  10.977  7.447 9.461  2.517 22.97  2.11Z  1.581  0.53Z  0.25I  1.25X
Sweden#  19.898  16.9'7X  17.389  2.51X 12.67  2.377  2.37X  0.002 7.771 5.46UX
United  States  n  .97Z 9.347  9.t2Z 0.35X 3.97  3.272 1.71%  1.552 1.127 2.66144
Table  7.  Sources  of  Revenue  for  Social  Security  Systems
Statutory  Contribution  Rates: Percentage  Distribution  of  Revenue-
Country  (percent  of  vages  or  payroll)  Contributions---  Other  Invest-
Inmred  Insured  Taxes  sent
Person  Employer Person  Eeployer  u  State)  Income  Other
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean
Haiti  2  -6X  4 - 12S
Oominican  Rep.  2.5  9.5
Jamaica  2.5*  2.5*  24.32  29.71  7.42 3B.5%  0.12
Peru  3  7 - 18.2  89.5  (both)  0.0  10.2Z  1.2X
Columbia  15.5  18  - 24  23.72  *55.ez  0.0  9.0X  11.42
Chile  24.6-26.5s*t  4.2 - 4.6  31.12  2.1Z 48.9%  15.91  2.0X
Brazil  8.5 - 10  14.7-16.9  15.6X  74.02  8.22  0.0  2.2X
"eex 4co  3.75  11.31#  19.7%  61.92  12.32  5.2Z  0.8X
Argentina  14  24
Sub-Saharan  Africa
The  6ambia  . 5  10
Kenya  5  5  25.32  25.32  49.32  0.02  0.02
Ghana  5  12.5
Zambia  5  5  38.52  29.51  0.02 32.82  0.2Z
Cote  d  lvoire  1.2  9.3-12.3  61.92  17.72  0.0  20.42  0.02
Nigeria  6  6  28.22 20.22 0.02 51.41  0.32
Cameroon  2.8  13-16.2  12.8X  64.42  0.02 22.92  0.02
Mauritius  3  6  tO.62  21.22  52.32  14.32  1.62
Congo  2.6  15.88  12.1l  80.2X  0.02  7.52  0.22
Europe,  Middle  East,  and  North  Africa
Morocco  1.9  13.8  8.42  78.42  0.02 13.21  0.02
Egypt  11  24
Turkey  14  20.54'  36.92  39.92  5.12 17.62  0.5X
Tunisia  6.25  18.5-26.5
Hungary  3 - 15  10 - 24  14.92 47.1X  38.02  0.02  0.02
Portugal  11.5  25  28.12  64.12 7.82  0.02  0.02
Yugoslavia  23.2+  Varies  66.72 24.52 7.32  0.92  0.62
Cyprus  6  6  35.1  35.32  20.62  8.2%  0.72
Israel  3.6  8.2t*  23.22  39.32  27.22  10.62  0.72
Asia
Bangladesh  (Not  reported)  19.42  43.42  4.3;.  32.92  0.02
Bursa  1  3  19.92  59.82  17.89  1.9X  0.52
India  9.75-10.5  11.6-13.4  29.72  33.72  1.12 32.72  2.82
Pakistan  0  12  0.02 72.32  0.12 26.92  0.52
Sri  Lanka  8  13-19.5  28.72  29.92  0.02 41.42  0.02
Indonesia  3  7+  16.52  49.42 0.02  O.OX  35.12
Philippines  2.85-4.55  7.75-9.45  20.02 31.4X  0.02 48.12  0.52
Thailand  0  0.2  - 4.5  0.02 64.02  3.72  32.31  0.0O
Malaysia  9.5  12.75  62.82  2.22  0.02 34.42  0.62
Korea  1.5  - 4  3.24
Singapore  25  25  39.62 42.02  0.02 17.92  0.52
Industrial  uarket  Countries
Japant#it  10.05  10.9-23.3  31.82  29.69  21.62 11.62 6.31
Sweden  O  30.45  1.89  b4M92  - 16.7X  16.72  0.02
United  Staten  7.05  12'.  34.92  45.12  17.62 2.32  0.1145
Table  B.  Distribution  of  benefits  among  types  of  benefits.
(Percent  of  total  benefits)
Country  Old  age,  Sickness  Other  Family  (Total
disability and  Work  Medical  Uneeploy-  Allow-  Medical
&  death  Maternity  Injury Care  sent  ance Other Care)
Latin  Awrica  and  the  Caribbean
Haiti
Dominican  Rep.
Jamaica  94.31  0.1%  5.6%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Peru  34.1%  58.8%  7.1%  0.01  0.0  0.0  0.0  65.5%
Columbia  28.89  62.9%  8.3%  0.0  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 59.9%
Chile  65.9%  14.9% 2.5%  0.0%  3.5%  9.6%  3.6%  12.7%
Brazil  62.1%  11.6%  0.6% 21.9%  0.0%  3.3%  0.47 21.9%




Kenya  99.0%  0.0%  0.0%  1.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  1.0%
Ghana
Zatbia  62.7%  0.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  36.4% 0.0%
Cote  d  Ivoire  32.9%  0.0:  24.1%  0.0%  0.0% 43.0%  0.0  0.0%
Nigeria  100.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Caiwoon  10.0%  0.0% 14.91  0.0%  0.0% 75.2%  0.0%  3.0%
Mauriiius  92.21  0.0%  t  0.0%  0.9%  7.4%  0.0%  0.0%
Congo  o  0.0%  O  t  0.0%  0.0%  OZ  0.0%  0.0O
Europe,  Middle  East,  and  North  Africa
Morocco  46.7%  2.5%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 50.9%  0.0%  0.0%
Egypt
Turkey  61.9%  19.01  3.2%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  15.91 17.0%
Tunisia
Hungary  54.1%  8.4%  0.4% 23.01  0.0% 11.6%  2.5%  23.0%
Portugal  67.9%  9.6%  0.0%  0.0%  3.3%  10.0% 9.1%  0.0%
Yugoslavia  53.3%  7.9%  0.3%  33.9%  0.0%  4.6%  0.0% 33.9%
Cyprus  95.B%  4.8%  1.7X.  0.0%  7.1%  0.0%  0.4%  0.1%
Israel  39.8%  3.3%  2.7%  32.8%  1.1% 19.1%  1.1% 34.2%
Asia
Bangladesh  43.4%  46.3%  10.3%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Burma  1.5%  27.3%  8.5% 62.6% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 62.6%
India  75.1%  8.5%  3.9%  11.0%  0.0%  0.0%  1.5%  11.0%
Pakistan  e  100.0%  '  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 85.3%
Sri  Lanka  100.0%  0.0%  O%OX  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0o  0.0%
Indonesia  38.5%  0.0% 61.5%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Philippines  73.7%  *  4.2%  22.1  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 23.3%
Thailand  0.0%  0.0%  100.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 41.2%
Malaysia  95.9%  0.0%  4.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.01  0.0%  0.4%
Korea
Singapore  97.7X  0.0%  2.3%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Industrial  Market  Countries
Japan  to  to  mm  to  to  to  to
Sweden  61.31  23.3%  1.4%  0.0o  5.1%  8.8%  0.0%  2.7%
United  States  Figures  for  1993  are  not  on  hand  as  of  this  writing.46
Notes  to Tables  5, 6, 7, and  8
Unfilled lines in these tables  are for countries  in our sample
for  which-=the International  Labour Office has  not  received
satisfactory  information. In several  cases  information  should  be
available  in time for an updated  version  of this paper  and  these
tables.
Table  5.
*  Expenditure  figures  do not include  some  administrative  expenses
which  apply  to several  programs.
All figures  are for  financial  years  ending  in 1983.
Sources:  Financial  flows:  International  Labour  Office (1988),
The  Cost  of  Social Security:  Twelfth international  inquiry.
1981-1983:  Basic  tables, Geneva  (provisional figures from
forthcoming  publication). Gross  Domestic  Product: International
Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics  Yearbook 1986
and Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook  1986,  Washington.
Table  6.  Trends  in financial  flows: Table  is forthcoming.
Financial flows are  from earlier editions of  I.L.O., Basic
Tables. GDP is from  I.M.F.,  °Fs  cit.
Table  7.
*Plus  additional  universal  contribution.  **Average  rate.
***Figures  reflect old system.  Under new system, the insured
worker's  contribution  rate  is 19.5%. Employer  rate  is  unchanged.
Contribution  rates  are for  1985,  revenue  and  GDP are for 1983.
Sources:  Contribution rates:  United States Social Security
Administration  (1986),  Social Security Programs  Throuahout  the
World - 1985,  Washington. Distribution  of revenue: I.L.O.,  op.
cit.
Table  8.
*Amounts  are included  in other  tables.
**Division  among  types  of benefits  is  not explicit.
[Jamaica-oad&d]:  Includes  6.6% for which the nature  of benefits
is not explicit.  (Mexico-other]:  Day  care for  children.
[Turkey-other]:  Funds  which apparently  provide  multiple  types  of
benefits.  [Portugal-other]:  Nature  of benefits  is not  explicit.
Heading "Other Medical Care":  Care not  included under other
benefits.  Heading "Total Medical Care":  Care  included under
various  benefits.
Data  are for 1983. Source:  I.L.O.,  2op cit*PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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